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When analyzing public policy in dynamic models with a representative agent,
it is standard practice to pick the consumption stream that maximizes the
representative agent's utility function. Since this practice is so universal,
it is almost unnecessary to cite examples. One can simply thumb through
any textbook treatment of growth theory, such as Barro and Sali-i-Martin
[1995] or Romer 119961,orany analysis of optimal monetary or fiscal policy,
such as Lucas and Stokey [1983] or Chari and Kehoe [1999]. The implicit
assumption in all of these treatments is that the appropriate social discount
rate for future consumption is the same as the private discount rate.
Occasionally there have been those who have voiced discomfort with this
prescription, especially those seeking to orient public policy more towards
the future. Ramsey [1928], while acknowledging that private agents discount
the future, argued that it was "ethically indefensible" for the government to
do so. Pigou [19291, Allais [1947], and Solow [1974] have expressed similar
views. For the most part, however, these views have either been ignored or
dismissed as paternalistic by the majority of economists. Arrow and Kurz
[1970] capture the feelings of the profession when they write:
It is hard to see why the revealed preference of individuals should
be disregarded in the realm of time, where it is accepted, broadly
speaking, in evaluating current commodity flows. (p. 12)
In this paper we argue against current practice, and in favor of the more
future-oriented vision. To immunize ourselves from charges of paternalism,
we retain a standard utilitarian approach to evaluating social welfare. We
show that social welfare corresponds to the agent's utility only under very
special conditions. Instead, a benevolent social planner will generally place
a greater weight on future consumption.
The main premise upon which we constmct our argument is the obser-
vation that agents discount the past, as well as the future. If individuals
discount both the past and the future, preferences change over time. The
present period weighs more heavily in current decisions than in the decisions
of any prior or subsequent period. This means that agents will regret their
past consumption choices. We label this form of regret retrospective time
inconsistency, since it involves disagreement over choices that were made in
1the past, as opposed to the standard form of time inconsistency which relates
to future plans.
While our approach is not in keeping with current practice, it is not
without precedent. In its essentials, our viewpoint was anticipated by Pigou
[1929] in his classic work on welfare economics:
The existence of preference for the present over equally certain
future pleasures does not imply that any economic dissatisfaction
would be suffered if future pleasures were substituted at full value
for present ones. The non-satisfaction this year of a man's pref-
erence to consume this year rather than next year is balanced by
the satisfaction of his preference next year to consume next year
rather than this year. (p. 25)
Time varying tastes pose a challenge for welfare economics. We adopt the
vision, familiar from the literature on time inconsistent preferences, that the
agent at each point in time is a separate individual. We then follow Pigou
119291 and Schelling [1984] in arguing that all of these temporally distinct
selves should be of concern to the social planner. The identification of an
optimal policy turns on how the planner should weigh the perspectives of
various periods. Any disagreement among the temporal selves will have to
be resolved by some form of compromise. We apply the logic of static welfare
theory to the dynamic case and formalize the compromise using a Bergsonian
social welfare function.
In this framework the currently standard practice of maximizing the util-
ity of a representative agent represents a form of dictatorship in which the
perspective of the current self is given full weight in the social welfare func-
tion. We label this approach the dictatorship of the present. Our view of this
dictatorship is that it has all the same ethical pros and cons as other forms of
dictatorship. It certainly helps resolve questions in a quick and easy manner,
but it may do so at the cost of doing tremendous and predictable harm to
someone else in society, in this case the future selves. We see no normative
reason to favor the present at the expense of the future. To paraphrase Ar-
row and Kurz: it is hard to see why dictatorship should be embraced in the
realm of time, where it is rejected, broadly speaking, in evaluating current
allocations.
Once we reject dictatorship, it follows immediately that the socially opti-
mal plan places greater weight on future utility than does the representative
2agent. Any social welfare function that places weight on future perspectives,
also places weight on perspectives that rank concerns of the future above
those of the present. The appropriate social discount rate is therefore lower
than that of the representative agent. By extension, competitive equilibrium
is myopic.
In section 2, we discuss the arguments for discounting the past and the
future, and make the case for retrospective time inconsistency. Section 3
presents our criterion for social optimality. We characterize the social dis-
count rate in terms of the agent's prospective and retrospective discount
rates and the properties of the social welfare function. Ingeneral,a social
planner should place greater weight on future consumption than does the
agent, and for many parameterizations, the social discount rate is actually
negative. This bias is decreasing in the weight that the agent places on the
past, so that it is in fact greatest if the past does not matter at all.
We conclude section 3 with a discussion of possible criteria for choosing
a social welfare function. We first consider the merits of a neutral view
that weights equally the perspective of each period of an agent's life. We
show that this approach does not generally lead to equal weights on the
utility from consumption in each period. Instead these weights depend on the
relationship between the prospective and retrospective discount rates and the
position of the period in the agents life. We next consider time consistency
as a criterion for selection. We show that a social planner's optimal policy
is time consistent only if the planner places quasi-hyperbolic weights on the
perspectives of future periods. We show that the planner does not have to
place very much weight on future perspectives to drive the social discount
rate to zero.
In section 4, we discuss a variety of issues raised by our approach. These
include the policy implications and the feasibility of applying the theory in
practice. We discuss how discounting the past sheds light on rational addic-
tion and procrastination. We close this section by discussing the relationship
to the literature. While we develop our approach in the context of time con-
sistency, our methodology is directly applicable to more general models of
time changing tastes.
32 Disagreement in the Exponential Model
2.1 Retrospective Time Inconsistency
Consider an agent choosing how to allocate consumption and resources across
two periods. The agent is endowed with a certain amount of a raw material
and a technology for transforming this material into period one and period
two consumption. We assume that the production possibility set is convex.
To keep things simple we suppose that the agent chooses consumption in
period one to maximize a time additive utility function:
U1(C1,C2) =
whereC represents consumption in period t ={1,2}, u(.) is the felicity
from consumption within a period, and fi C [0,11 is the discount factor. To
avoid later confusion, we will reserve .the term "utility" for the welfare of the
agent in period t, U, and the term "felicity" for the contribution to utility
of consumption in period t in the absence of discounting, it(Ce).
The solution to this problem is straightforward and can be found in almost
any undergraduate textbook. The optimal policy is to choose the point on
the production possibility frontier associated with the highest indifference
curve of the utility function U1. This solution is represented by point A in
the Fisher diagram (Figure 1).
What is not generally appreciated is that this solution represents the
optimal choice only from the perspective of the first period, and does not
generally maximize second period utility. To see this, let's proceed as is
common in dynamic models and treat the past as sunk both for choice and
for welfare. In this case second period utility is simply
U2(C1, C2) =t4C2). (1)
Given this utility function, the second period indifference curves are horizon-
tal and, from the second period perspective, the optimal choice of consump-
tion is represented by point B in Figure 1.
The reason that tastes change in this example is that the agent places no
weight on period 1 consumption in period 2. One might object that (1) is
really only a partial representation of the individual's welfare. It represents
that component of the agent's decision that is still "active" at the time of
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Per 1the period t decision, and ignores the past only because the past is sunk. As
Deaton [1992] has emphasized, a complete specification of preferences must
always rank the entire consumption stream.
Even if the past enters period 2 welfare, however, the conditions under
which tastes remain unchanged are very stringent. Consider the foUowing
specification of preferences in which the agent in period 2 cares about both
period one and period two consumption
U2(C1,C2) =Su(Ci)+u(C2), (2)
Here S represents the "discount" factor applied to past felicity. We place the
word discount in quotation marks because we want to allow for the possibility
that 5 is greater than one. Note (2) reduces to (1) when we restrict the
domain of U2 to current consumption.
From (2) it is easy to see that a necessary and sufficient condition for
tastes to be unchanging over time is that 5 =/3.In this case, U2 is simply
a monotonic transformation of Uj.'
If, on the other hand, 6/3_ipreferencesover consumption sequences
change over time. A natural concomitant of 6fl'willbe regret concerning
past consumption choices. In the example above, the consumer regrets in
period 2 the choice of A in period 1. In period 2, the consumer wishes that the
choice had been closer to point 13. We see this as a form of time inconsistency
that operates in a backward-looking rather than in a forward-looking manner
and refer to the phenomenon as retrospective time inconsistency in order to
distinguish it from the more familiar prospective time inconsistency.
The argument easily extends to a multi-period setting. Consider an in-
finite horizon, t e{O,1,2,. ..}. Wecan represent the agent's utility over
consumption sequences by a function that discounts both the past and the
future:
U(Co, C1,...) => 6mu(ct)+ u(ct) + >/fu(ct÷), (3)
Figure 2 illustrates both the discount factor of an individual in period zero
and an individual in period ten under the assumption that 6 =/3 = .9.
1Deaton [19921 and Mas-Collel,Whinstonand Green [1995] implicitly assume 6 =







In period zero the agent places exponentially declining weights on future
felicity. In particular, period zero licity receives greater weight than period
ten felicity. In period ten, the agent place exponentially declining weights
on both past and future felicity, and the relative weights on period zero and
period ten are reversed.
We can see from (3) that retrospective time inconsistency is perfectly
consistent with exponentiai discounting and time consistency in the standard
sense.2 Given any dates d > s > t, the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption at s and s' is independent of the period of evaluation t:
pd-sg (C3t)
u'(C3)
Thisproperty implies that optimal plans made to maximize (3) are time
consistent: a plan chosen to maximize utility in period t will remain optimal
in all subsequent periods.
We also see from (3) that time consistency does not imply a preference
ordering over sequences of consumption that is time invariant. Time consis-
tency only requires that preferences over future consumption are unchanging.
It does not rule out disagreements over the past. Retrospective time consis-
tency requires exponential discounting and 6=
2Strotz[1956] showal that exponential discounting is necary and sufficient for time
consistency.
7
2 4 6 8 lO12 1416182022The question whether choices today maximize utility from the perspective
of all future time periods therefore boils down to how much agents care about
the past. Is it reasonable that S = ordo preferences change over time?
In the next section, we review the case for discounting the future and argue
that the case for discounting the past is at least as persuasive.
2.2 The Argument for Discounting: Future and Past
Ever since BBhm-Bawerk [1959] first proposed discounting as one of the
prime reasons for positive interest rates, there has been near unanimity
among economists that individuals discount future felicity relative to present
felicity.3 The main argument in favor of discounting is empirical. It appears
to be the revealed preference of individuals that current pleasure is preferred
to future pleasure, and future pain to current pain. Introspection supports
this view, as do market interest rates in excess of the growth rate of popula-
tion and productivity, and so does the available experimental evidence from
economics and psychology.4
Given that individuals discount the future, invariance requires that agents
weigh the past more heavily than they do the present. In other words, it
requires that a thirty year old cares more about an apple that was consumed
at age three than about an apple to be consumed today. Moreover, the
importance of that apple at age three relative to an apple today must grow
at an exponential rate as the consumer ages.
This implication of invariance is difficult to accept. Rather than viewing
past consumption as progressively more important as the consumer ages,
it is more plausible that agents discount past consumption. When asked
most people would prefer having completed an onerous task last week over
having to perform one this evening; they would prefer a pleasurable meal
this evening to one ten years ago; and they would prefer to be leaving on
vacation to returning to work when their vacation is over.5'6 Whenever one
3For a rare statement of dissent see Becker and Stigler [1977].
4Although supportive of discounting, the experimental evidence does not necessarily
support exponential discounting.SeeAinslie [19921.
5Thislast statement assumes that the vacation is a pleasurable experience. For some
families this may not be true. In this case the inequality is reversed, but the point is the
same.
6There will, of course, be exceptions. There may be that particularly pleasurable
Sthinks, "I'm glad it is finally three o'clock and that lecture is over," it reflects
discounting of the past. The disagreeable experience is less painful when it
is in the past than when it is being experienced in the present.7
Beyond revealed preference, the strongest theoretical argument in favor
of discounting, involves what Böhm-Bawerk referred to as the "brevity and
uncertainty of human life." According to this view, people discount future
felicity because they may not be around to enjoy it. An individual weighs
pleasures at date t by the conditional probability of living until date t.
There is a parallel between mortality and forgetfulness. The past dies
when we forget.8 Do we value today meals eaten ten years ago, if we cannot
even remember what we ate? How is our current utility reduced by past pains
that we cannot even remember? Imperfect memory justifies discounting the
past in much the same way that mortality justifies discounting the future,
and just as mortality suggests that we discount the far off future more than
the near future, imperfect memory suggests that we discount the far off past
more than the recent past.
Finally, heterogeneity in discount rates across individuals undermines the
case for retrospective consistency. If, as is commonly believed, the rich and
educated are more forward looking, do they place relatively lessweighton
the past as invariance would require? To the extent that individual discount
rates are endogenous, as argued by Becker and Mulligan [1997], does the
weight on the past adjust to maintain 6 =3'?Or is the weight on the
past also endogenous? After aU, we spend considerable resources keeping the
past alive, through stories, photographs, souvenirs, and diaries. If the weight
on the past is endogenous, wouldn't it be a remarkable quirk of fate of this
occurrence which yields memories for years to come, memories so precious that one is
glad that the experience was in the past so that the memories could be enjoyed over an
extended period of time. Similar exceptions, however, apply to discounting the future.
One may, for example, want to delay a particularly pleasurable event in order to savor
the feelings of anticipation that it engenders (Loewenstein [19871). The existence of a few
exceptions, however, does not alter the general rule.
TSome suggestive evidence comes from DeGenova [19921 who found that when people
looked back on their lives they most regretted not spending more time on education.
Education, being an activity with current costs and future rewards, is a prime candidate
for retrospective time inconsistency.
8The experimental evidence in psychology indicates that exponential decay of recall
probabilities fits the data rather well, although a power function may perform better (See
Crovitz and Schiffman [19741).
9weight were exactly equal to the inverse of the discount factor?
We conclude that in almost any reasonable formulation, future selves
weight current consumption less heavily than does the current selL The
implication is that tastes change over time. We now consider the welfare
implications of this observation.
3 Dynamic Welfare Theory
As with most economic theory, the roots of the dynamic case are to be
found in a close examination of the static case. In static welfare theory we
begin with a set of individuals with preferences defined on an appropriate
commodity space. We add a social planner who has available a set of policy
tools, each of which is identified with a particular consumption bundle for
each individual in the economy. The social planner is then assumed to pick
a policy that satisfies some set of ethical desiderata. The most universally
accepted of these is Pareto optimality. Beyond Pareto optimality one might
look to load on other properties directly, as in cooperative bargaining theory,
or implicitly, as when maximizing some social welfare function.
The case of a dynamic representative agent is no different. AU that is
needed is to identify the set of policy choices available to the social planner,
the relevant set of individuals, their payoffs, and the nature of the social
welfare criterion.
Identifying the set of policy choices is relatively straightforward. This set
is usually given as part of the data of the problem or as the set of equilibrium
outcomes of some model.
The set of individuals is not a trivial matter. We have seen that even in
representative agent models with exponential discounting, tastes may change
over time. Which preferences should the planner maximize? Instead of
constructing a theory around a fixed answer to this question, we adopt a
framework that is flexible enough that it allows for the possibility that the
perspective of each point in time may affect welfare. We take the set of in-
dividuals to be the set of temporally distinct selves indexed by time. Given
this collection of individuals, the payoff function for the date t self is given
by the U in equation (2).
One way to think about the set of individuals is to consider a Rawlsian
thought experiment: which self shows up to represent the interests of the
l0individual in the initial position? When thinking about retirement, for ex-
ample, does the individual take the perspective of a retired person receiving a
pension or a young person saving? Our view is that each of these perspectives
has some merit and that some form of compromise is natural.9
This leaves only the determination of the welfare criterion. We will begin
by analyzing the set of Pareto optimal allocations, and then turn to the issues
involved in choosing among Pareto optima.
3.1 Properties of Pareto Optima
For the purposes of discussion we shall assume a finite horizon T > 0 and
we shall assume that the set of policy choices are limited by the budget
constraint
(1 +r)t￿W
where rrepresentsthe rate of return on saving and W represents the initial
resource endowment.
Let P denote the set of Pareto optimal allocations CT ={C0,C1, .. . CT}
RT. We state the following standard result without proof.
Lemma Consider the problem of a social planner maximizing the weighted
average of the individual's utilities:
S(UO,Ul,...,UT)=QtUt. (4)
Let Ps,> denote the set of consumption streams (7 that achieve the
maximum of S for some weights t￿0, for all t. Then Psp= P.
9RawIs [1999] reaches essentially the same conclusion:
The question is settlal by reference to the original position;.. .There is no
reason for the partS to give any weight to mere position in time....lf they
make a distinction between earlier and more remote periods because, say, the
future states of affairs seem less important now, the present state of affairs
will seem less important in the future.
Rawis concludes that pure time preference is unjust. In section 3.2, however, we show that
an equal weighting of each period in life does not imply an absence of time preference,
only more forward looking behavior.
11Hence to study the set of Pareto optima, we may study the properties of
the class of linear Bergsonian social welfare functions of the fonn (4). Note
that standard approach of maximizing the present value of the agent's utility
is a member of this class of welfare functions. In this case, the period zero
self receives all of the weight in the social welfare function: ao >0and at =0
for all t >0.This is a form of dictatorship, which we term the dictatorship
of the present.
AU social welfare functions of the form (4) are non-paternalistic in the
sense that welfare economics uses the term (see Mas-Collel, Whinston, and
Green [1995, p. 895]). They are functions only of the agent's own utility
and the planner does not have any direct preference over the allocation.
Note, however, that the social choice will not in general be the same as the
private choice. Whether or not this welfare function is paternalistic in the
broader sense of the term depends on how the society decides to implement
the social optimum: through dictate or by altering the incentives that mould
the agent's own choices.
After substituting for the U, we have that maximizing S is equivalent to
maximizing
where
=> aj3+ at + >a58_t
a=O a=t-f-1
Thenext result follows immediately:
Proposition 1: If 8 ￿ /3', then for all t C {0, 1,... T —1},qt,/qt ￿ /3.
Theinequality is strict if and only if 8 cf3'and a3 >0for some
s>t.
qt1/qt is the social discount factor relating period t and period t + 1
felicity. The proposition states the sense in which the dictatorship of the
present is the most present biased of the Pareto optima. If S c3-',then any
social welfare function that places weight on any future perspective discounts
future felicity by less than the dictatorship of the present.
There is a sense in which increasing the weight on the perspective of
period t in the social planner's problem shifts consumption towards period
12t. Let at= adenotes the ratio of the marginal utility of
consumption in period t + 1 to the marginal utility in period t.
Proposition 2: Given 5 C/3',da8/dat U for s Ctandda3/da ￿ 0 for
s>t.
Proof: The statement follows from manipulating the social planer's Euler
equation. 0
The proposition states that an increase in the weight given the period t
perspective causes marginal felicity to fall more rapidly prior to t and rises
less rapidly after t. If 5 is small enough and the weight on future perspectives
is high enough it is possible for attobecome negative, so that consumption
is rising for some period of time.
To see how these propositions work, consider the two period example with
5 =0,and consider the following social welfare function:
S =aU+ (1 —a)U2.
In this case, varying the choice of a from zero to one traces the production
possibility frontier from B to A. Mi of these points are Pareto optimal. Any
movement from any one of them either violates the resource constraint or
reduces welfare from the perspective of one of the periods. The standard
practice of maximizing the utility of representative agent is equivalent to
setting a =1.Note that standard practice does not yield a random selection
from the set of Pareto optima. Rather point A is the most present oriented
element of P. Any a <1produces an outcome that is more favorable towards
the future than a= 1.
If we raise 5 the period two optimum B moves along the production
possibility frontier towards A The range of Pareto optima shrinks, until
at S =8'preferences coincide. Intuitively, the less backward looking are
second period preferences, the more forward looking is the set of Pareto
optima. This result also holds with many periods. The less backward looking
agents are the more forward looking the set of Pareto optima.
Proposition 3: Let P5 represent the set of Pareto optimal allocations given
a retrospective discount rate of 5. if &> 52, thenPo
13Proof: See Appendix. LI
Itis interesting to consider how the social discount rate behaves at long
horizons. Suppose a =atso that the welfare function discounts future
utility at rate a, and let the time horizon T go to infinity. It is easy to
calculate the following result.
Proposition 4: Let a =andT =oc,then lim..qi/qt =max{a,fl}.
As the horizon becomes long, the relative weights that the welfare func-
tion places on felicity in adjacent periods approaches the maximum of the
prospective discount factors of the planner and the agent. To understand
this limit, note that there are two channels by which the felicity in the far
future impacts welfare. The first is through individuals in the near future
who care about felicity in the far future. These individuals discount future
felicity by j3. The second is through individuals in the far future who care
about felicity in the near future. The welfare function discounts the utility
of these individuals by a. Which channel is more important in the limit
depends on which discount factor is larger.
3.2 Choosing a Social Welfare function
The set of possible social welfare functions is potentially large. While we find
dictatorship inherently troubling, eliminating dictatorial welfare functions
eliminates only a few scattered elements in this set. How is one to choose a
social welfare function?
One potential criterion for narrowing the set is symmetry. Placing equal





Figure3 illustrates these weights for several values of 6. For 6 =fl',all
perspectives agree to discount later periods and q declines exponentially. For
6 =fi,qt is hump-shaped, rising for t cT/2 and falling thereafter. Felicity









Figure 3: Social weights on felicity for various values of delta.'°
periods of evaluation and is therefore not discounted by as much as felicity
in early or late periods. For 6 =0,q is monotonically rising. q rises because
felicity in the future matters more than felicity in the past.
We draw two conclusions from figure 3. First, we see that equal weights
on utility in all periods does not imply equal weights on felicity in all periods.
Second, we see that the less the agent cares about the past, the more the
social planner cares about the future.
While symmetry may have some appeal when the horizon is finite, it has
undesirable consequences when the horizon is infinite. As noted by Koop-
mans [1960], a social welfare function which gives equal weight to utility at
all dates is insensitive to changes in utility at any given point in time. One
potential solution is to discount future perspectives, choosing at =at.This,
however, leaves the choice of a to be determined.
Another criterion that significantly reduces the set of Pareto optima is
time consistency. If we think of the social optimum as being implemented
over time by a social planner, then the planner may be tempted to alter
the policy as time passes. Why, for example, should the social planner care
about the feelings of past selves, when these feelings are past and cannot be
altered? At date t the planner may decide to reset a8 to zero for all s<t
and a =a._tfor all s￿t. The next proposition presents a class of social
10For all cnrv beta=.9 and the horizon is 10.
15
0 2 4 6 8 10welfare functions that are time consistent and immune to such behavior.
Proposition 5: Suppose S </3.Let a0= 1and, for t >0,let at =
(7_p)7t-1 where[8, oo). Then the social planner discounts future
felicity at the constant rate 'y.
The proposition provides the utility weights that generate exponential
discounting of felicity. It states that if the planner has a certain quasi-
hyperbolic discount rate, then the planner is time consistent. In an infinite
horizon, this approach is robust in to Koopmans' critique if [8,1).It
still leaves undetermined.
One recurrent theme in welfare economics is a dislike for discounting. A
preference for equal weights on felicity is implicit in Ramsey's [1928] con-
tention that discounting the future was "ethically indefensible," and is also
implied in the quotation from Pigou [1929] cited in the introduction. To
generate equal weights on felicity the planner needs to choose aj= 1and
at =1— for all t >0.Given conventional calibrations of fi, the weight on
the perspective of each future year is then 1/20 of the weight on the current
perspective. What is surprising here is that it does not take much weight
on the future perspectives to generate a very forward looking social welfare
function.
A final possibility is to deduce the social welfare function empirically
through the revealed preference of policy makers. This could be done by
analyzing situations in which agents make choices that they believe would
be in the best interests of other agents and comparing these choices to the
choices that agents make for themselves.
4 Discussion
We begin with an number of observations concerning the practical implica-
tions of our approach and conclude with a discussion of the related literature.
4.1 Policy Implications
Our analysis has immediate implications for public policy: agents discount
the future too much and therefore governments should promote future ori-
ented policies. Theoretically, our analysis provides a foundation for what
16Malinvaud [1985] calls an Allais equilibrium (See also Allais [1947]). An Al-
lais equilibrium is a situation in which individual preferences are retained for
the choice between consumption goods at the same date, but not necessarily
between consumption goods at different dates.
Relative to the market evaluation, our analysis tips the scales in favor of
policies with short run costs and long run benefits. In the area of fiscal policy,
it favors subsidies to capital accumulation. In the area of monetary policy,
it favors low inflation. In the area of natural resource extraction, it favors
conservation. In general, it favors investment and saving at the expense of
consumption.
4.2 Procrastination
O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999a] model procrastination using time inconsis-
tent preferences that exhibit a bias towards current felicity. They argue that
procrastination occurs when a time inconsistent individual acts later than a
time consistent individual would act, and that preponation occurs when a
time inconsistent individual acts relatively sooner. They argue that procras-
tination is more likely when an agent incurs the costs of an action prior to
the reward and that preponation is more likely when rewards precede costs.
Discounting past felicity provides an alternative characterization of pro-
crastination and preponation. In this characterization, agents are time con-
sistent, but they regret their past actions. Procrastination is associated with
a wish that an action had been taken at an earlier date. Preponation is
associated with a wish that an action had not been taken at an earlier date.
As in O'Donoghue and Rabin, procrastination will tend to occur when
costs precede rewards. At the time that an act is postponed, these costs
appear salient and the future rewards are discounted. In the future, the
agent comes to regret this delay, because, if the action had been taken, the
rewards which would now be received would be salient, and the costs which
would have been incurred in the past would be discounted. In a similar
manner, preponation is associated with rewards that precede costs.
4.3 Addiction
Becker and Stigler [1977] and Becker and Murphy [1988] model addiction as
rational. Agents are time consistent and have stable felicity functions. They
17weigh the present value of costs and benefits of consuming the addictive
substance and consciously choose to become addicts.
Because addiction is the result of a rational choice in this framework,
there is the impression that addicts are "happy" or at least better off than
they would have been if the option to become addicted had never existed.
This vision of the "happy addict" has caused some economists to question
the usefulness of the framework (O'Donoghue and Rabin {1999b]).
This welfare calculation, however, assumes that agents are retrospectively
time consistent. Harmful addiction is a case in which rewards precede costs.
The addict decides that the benefits to current consumption of the addictive
substance outweigh the future costs of increased addiction. As in the case
of procrastination, agents who discount the past may come to regret their
past behavior as these future costs become salient. Rational choice may
maximize utility from the current perspective, but this does not imply that
future utility is also maximized. Rational addicts need not be happy addicts.
There may therefore be a rationale for prohibition as a means of protecting
the agent's future self from his current decisions.
4.4 Political Feasibility
One might argue that the case for the dictatorship of the present is positive
rather than normative, If social decisions result from a democratic process,
then the current self would indeed appear to be a dictator, since only the
current self can vote. The dictatorship of the present, being the only criterion
that is practically implementable, would then arise as a type of constrained
optimum.
It is not obvious, however, that political constraints favor the dictatorship
of the present. Far sighted policy may arise in a number of ways. Sen [1961J
and Marglin [1963] have shown how altruism may lead agents to vote for
policies that are more forward looking than the choices they would make for
themselves. Their argument is framed in an intergenerational context, but is
easily cast in an intrapersonal setting.
Example: Consider two altruistic agents. Each cares about their own utility
and the welfare of the other agent. They maximize
U0(G0, C1) + cbS(Ôo, ci)
18where U0 is a utility function of the form (2) and C is their own con-
sumption, and S is a social welfare function of the form (4) and C is the
other agent's consumption. 0 is a weight that characterizes the degree
of altruism. Absent any possibility of coordination, each will choose a
savings rate that maximizes U0. This savings rate will not generally
maximize S. If in this position they were then offered a policy that
would jointly increase both their savings rates, they would gladly vote
to accept it. The loss in utility, U0, would more than be replaced by
the gain in S.
Even in the absence of altruism forward looking policies might survive.
Once in office, candidates would do well to note that tastes change over time.
If they wish to remain in office, they may not want to maximize constituents'
current utility, but their utility at the time of the next election." Other
policy makers, especially Presidents, seem to be very concerned about how
they will be judged by history The perspective of history, however, is the
perspective of the future. These policy makers may also prove to be more
far sighted than the average voter.
Finally, there are many social decisions that lie outside of the democratic
process. Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal judges are
appointed for long terms partly to allow these decision makers to take a longer
term perspective. Beyond government, many individuals, such as parents
and teachers, often find themselves placed in situations where their decisions
affect the welfare of others at various points in time. These individuals too
may behave like our social planner.
Given the complexities of the political constraints cited above, our ap-
proach is to first characterize the unconstrained optimum.
4.5 Consumer Sovereignty
Much of welfare economics as it now stands is based on the idea of consumer
sovereignty: no one is in a better position to know what an agent wants than
the agent himself. This is the belief that underlies the the quote of Arrow
and Kurz presented in the introduction. Some may find our analysis trou-
lilt may be possible to estinlate the extent to which agents discount the past by ob-
serving how politicians voting patterns vary with their remaining term in office.
19bling because it appears to dispense with consumer sovereignty, and seems to
replace the dictatorship of present with the dictatorship of the social planner.
Consumer sovereignty, however, is not an axiom upon which to base a
theory but a conclusion that one draws after one has understood the prob-
lem. There are many cases in which society chooses to discard consumer
sovereignty. Parents are given power over children. Suicide is discouraged.
The reason that consumer sovereignty is so appealing is that there are
well known problems with real world social planners. In practice, planners
rarely have the information necessary to maximize the utility of those under
their care or sufficient incentive to do the job well. All too often they have
agendas of their own which interfer with their trusteeship. Society must
therefore take caution in how it implements the dictates of any social welfare
function. It is often best to let individuals make their own mistakes, then to
impose society's mistakes upon them.
This is more a question of how best to implement the social optimum
than a question of what form of the social welfare function should take. The
real lesson of consumer sovereignty is that it is often best to alter incentives
and allow agents to make their own decisions than to dictate actions. In
the consumption saving example of the last section, society does not need
to make all of the consumption and savings decisions for the individual in
order to maximize a social welfare function of the form (4). The government
only needs to determine the appropriate tax rates. Consider the condition
for optimal consumption when an agent maximizes a utility fuction of the
form (2):
u'(Cj) =fl(1+ r)u'(C2).
If the government wishes that the agent behave as if he discounted future
felicity by /3 > 1, it needs to subsidize saving so that the agent perceives
a gross rate of return of (1 + r)/3/fl rather than 1 + r. The government
already practices this type of intervention in the price system. Jn the case
of income taxes and capital gains taxes, however, the government generally
pushes returns in the opposite direction.
To the extent that the social optimum can be implemented through the
price system, it would not appear to do terrible damage to the principle of
consumer sovereignty.
204.6 On the Interpretation of the Utility Function
Until this point we have treated the utility function U as the welfare of the
agent in period t, but we have been deliberately vague as to what we meant
by this. For most of the argument all we need is that U represents the agent's
ranking of consumption sequences in period t. This is enough to motivate
retrospective time inconsistency and the need to aggregate the perspectives
of different periods. Whereas the precise weights that the planner places
on the different perspectives will require some notion of cardinal utility, the
presumption that the planner should tilt the scale towards the future requires
only an aversion to dictatorship.
In order to better understand the welfare problem, however, it is useful
to consider how these thoice rankings relate to the level of satisfaction ex-
perienced by the agent over time. This is essentially a question of why the
future and the past matter to an agent in the present. As Loewenstein [1992}
has pointed out, there are essentially two answers to this question, one due
to Jevons and the other to Samuelson.'2 In order to avoid confusion we will
use the words pleasure and happiness when referring to this experience of
satisfaction over time, and contrast these with utility U and felicity Ut.
Accordingto the Jevonian perspective the future and the past matter
because they directly influence the agent's present happiness. Agents feelings
today are influenced by memories of the past and anticipations of the future.
In this view, U represents the pleasure that the agent experiences in period
t. F\iture and past felicity are discounted in U, because these experiences are
less immediate than current ones.
Given the .Jevonian perspective the social welfare function (4) counts
felicity multiple times, but this is because felicity is experienced multiple
times. Felicity at date t is fkst experienced as anticipation at dates a < t,
then as part of current date t enjoyment, and finally as memory at dates a > t.
The weights on felicity in (4) reflect these multiple perspectives, as well as the
weights that the social planner assigns to these perspectives. According to the
Jevonian perspective, the dictatorship of the present is extremely myopic. It
focuses solely on current pleasure and completely ignores all future pleasure.
At the other extreme, the Samuelsonian perspective states that the plea-
sure that an agent experiences in period t is associated with the period t
12Caplinand Leahy [2000J for a more detailed discussion of these views and their
relationship to welfare theory.
21felicity u(cj). Only current consumption makes the agent happy. In order to
come to grips with the fact that agents care about future consumption but
receive utility only from current consumption, the Samuelsonian perspective
divides the period t self into two components: a decision maker and a con-
sumer. The consuming self experiences period t felicity. The decision making
self essentially acts as an internal social planner who aggregates the prefer-
ences of the consuming selves of various periods. In this view, U represents
the preferences of the internal social planner at date t.'3
According to the Samuelsonian perspective, when 6 $J3the internal
social planner's rankings of consumption sequences changes over time, and
the social welfare function (4) represents an aggregation of these rankings.
Consumption at date t provides pleasure only at date t, but the weight placed
on date t felicity reflects an average of the weights placed on date t felicity
by internal social planners at all dates.
4.7RelatedLiterature
In the rare cases in which the past is explicitly considered or in which the per-
spectives of different temporal selves are considered, economists commonly
assume that agents discount the past. Pigou [1929], Wolf [1970], and Page
(1977] consider utility functions in which the past enters with diminishing
weight. Pigou and Page note that this implies that tastes change over time.
In the literature on time inconsistency, Phelps and Pollak [1968] and
Laibson [1996] discuss the welfare effects of changes in the savings rate in
the presence of hyperbolic discounting. Each considers the effect of these
changes on the utility of the various temporal selves. In each case, future
selves are assumed to place no weight on past consumption. Neither note
that this assumption implies that tastes change even if preferences are time
consistent.
In models with overlapping generations it is common to consider how
parents and children care about each others utility. In Barro's [1974] model
of imperfect altruism, for example, parents care about the utility of their
children, but children do not care about the utility of their parents. This
'3Kahneman, Wakker and Satin [1997] argue that the external social planner should
ignore the perspective of the internal social planner and focus solely on the various con-
suming selves. The problem with this approach is that it entirely divorces interteinporal
social choice from intertemporal private choice.
22gives rise to a utility function for each generation in which future felicity is
discounted exponentially, but past felicity is given no weight. Others have
considered two-sided altruism (Abel [19871, Kimball [1987]). Here the com-
mon assumption is that S Cf3which gives rise to a discount factor lcinked
at the present as in Figure 2. The focus of these papers, however, is on the
validity of Ricardian equivalence, not social welfare.'4
The literature contains several other arguments in support of a lower
social discount rate. These arguments tend to focus on intergenerational
conflicts. Many authors have argued that it is troublesome to rank the needs
of the present generation above those of future generations (e.g. Ramsey
(1928) and Solow [1974)). Others have argued for a reduced social discount
rate based on the fact that some private decisions have external effects on
future generations. One example is capital left after death (Pigou [1929]).
These arguments are really dynamic extensions of static welfare argu-
ments. Shell 11971] has shown that the overlapping generations model can
be reinterpreted as a static Arrow-Debreu model in which all agents trade
simultaneously. The first argument is therefore no different than the static
argument for income redistribution. The second argument rests on a missing
market. In the example, it is the market for annuities. In contrast to these
arguments, our story has no static counterpart. Time is essential for tastes
to change.
These intergenerational arguments also focus attention on long horizons.
These arguments make a big difference over a span of 50 to 100 years, but they
tend to be ignored over shorter horizons such as the business cycle. There is a
tendency in the literature to only discuss the issue of social discounting when
considering long term issues such as global warming or resource extraction.
The argument presented in this paper, in contrast, is operative in the short
run as well as the long run. It applies as well to monetary policy as social
security, as well to unemployment insurance as to the environment.
'4There is also a literature on weffare in overlapping generations models. This literature
focus on the question of whether expected lifetime utility should be evaluated uncondi-
tionally (Muench [1977]) or conditional on the information available in the first period of
life (Peleg [1982]). In our view, both approaches suffer from a dictatorship of the young
and ignore the fact that agents may view consumption profiles quite differently when old.
235 Conclusion
We formulate the problem of a social planner attempting to maximize wel-
fare over time. We argue against the currently practice of equating the social
discount rate and the private discount rate. Our analysis has immediate
implications for public policy: agents discount the future too much and gov-
emments should promote future oriented policies.
246 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
Let 8 > 2. Suppose CT We show that C' E 62SinceC'" P,
there exist weights {at} such that CT maximizes S subject to the constraint
on consumption. The {at} are associated with weights on, felicity {qt}- We
show that for 62 C 5, there exist non-negative weights {ât} which yield
weights on felicity {qt}. Therefore with 62 CT solves the social planner's
problem with weights {&},andC2' ö2
Theproof is by induction. We begin with T = 2. S(U1, £12) = aiU1(C2) +
a2U2(C2) =(a1+ .51a2)u(Cj)+(ai + a2)u(C2). Hence q, = a1 + 61a2 and
= /3a1+ a2. Tomaintain these weights on felicity, the weights on utility
must be: a1 = and a2 = Ifthe a1and a2 that yield q
and q, are non-negative forthenthe & and &2 that yield q and q, are
non-negative for 2 ct5i.
Supposenow that the Proposition is true for T = N. Consider T =
N + 1. In this case, q = >I::ii aflt_8 + at + a,6_t. Consider
the first N of these equations, the equations for {qi,.. .,qp,r},and replace
aN + aN÷1ô1 in these equations with AN. The resulting system gives the
weights on utility {ao,.. .aN_IJAN} necessary to generate weights on felicity
{qi, .. . , qjq}.Since the propositi?n holds for T = N, given 2 < 1, there
exist non-negative {ào,.. QJQU, AN} that generate {qi,... ,q1.çr}.It remains
to show that Ap, can be decomposed into non-negative aN and aN+1. We
can use the equations for qN+1, q, and to solve for aN and aN÷j in
terms of the q's.Itis easily seen that the resulting aN and aN+1 are positive.
This completes the proof.D
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